Looks like AI slop and certainly not wormable in the traditional sense. Hard to imagine that your access to a Tailscale SSH server would then allow further replication, and certainly it would not allow for meaningful cross-tenant replication.
This is just slop, even if any of the issues raised here are real or not, no human bothered to want to contribute to its authorship. The linked website is something like 10,000 words that by and large convey nothing useful to the reader. HN is going to need a flag for these articles so nobody wastes and time under the illusion that there’s anything worth reading.
there are fair and not fair points in all this (too much AI?).
to be fair, config choices like tailnet lock and ephemeral keys can be used to mitigate.
however, the enumeration of the entire tailnet leading to one compromised node providing the whole map (e.g. hugging face) is inherent in their architecture. that one can be mitigated by ACLs for small networks, but that is unwieldy at scale.
i do have to agree that tailscale is a vpn - which is not easily reconfigured to follow more zero trust principles. so their zero trust washing marketing is disingenuous. they could stick with their strength: an easy to use version of a great vpn (wireguard).
(tailscalar here): it's been a long day working on this, and we will have more details to follow. quickly though, on this point about enumeration, some of this may be a difference in headscale. the tailscale control plane performs what we colloquially refer to as "netmap trimming" - if node a has no acls that allow it to do anything with node b, then neither a or b would see each other in their netmap.
trimming is a neat feature - thanks for that - thought the ACLs are often not there to begin with because configuring off the full node level access defaults of the vpn is difficult, at least at scale.
not specific to ts - all vpns and firewalls have the same intrinsic issue.
Tailscales architecture of increasing its scope while having insufficient isolation is why I don't use it. (I just want the mesh, but their non-root setup instructions are now gone!)
That said, these vulnerabilities aren't that significant.
Looks like AI slop and certainly not wormable in the traditional sense. Hard to imagine that your access to a Tailscale SSH server would then allow further replication, and certainly it would not allow for meaningful cross-tenant replication.
Seems like they responded on Reddit: https://www.reddit.com/r/Tailscale/comments/1xekjpd/tailworm...
This is just slop, even if any of the issues raised here are real or not, no human bothered to want to contribute to its authorship. The linked website is something like 10,000 words that by and large convey nothing useful to the reader. HN is going to need a flag for these articles so nobody wastes and time under the illusion that there’s anything worth reading.
there are fair and not fair points in all this (too much AI?).
to be fair, config choices like tailnet lock and ephemeral keys can be used to mitigate.
however, the enumeration of the entire tailnet leading to one compromised node providing the whole map (e.g. hugging face) is inherent in their architecture. that one can be mitigated by ACLs for small networks, but that is unwieldy at scale.
i do have to agree that tailscale is a vpn - which is not easily reconfigured to follow more zero trust principles. so their zero trust washing marketing is disingenuous. they could stick with their strength: an easy to use version of a great vpn (wireguard).
(tailscalar here): it's been a long day working on this, and we will have more details to follow. quickly though, on this point about enumeration, some of this may be a difference in headscale. the tailscale control plane performs what we colloquially refer to as "netmap trimming" - if node a has no acls that allow it to do anything with node b, then neither a or b would see each other in their netmap.
appreciate your hard work and ts in general.
trimming is a neat feature - thanks for that - thought the ACLs are often not there to begin with because configuring off the full node level access defaults of the vpn is difficult, at least at scale.
not specific to ts - all vpns and firewalls have the same intrinsic issue.
Tailscales architecture of increasing its scope while having insufficient isolation is why I don't use it. (I just want the mesh, but their non-root setup instructions are now gone!)
That said, these vulnerabilities aren't that significant.
Meh.