> Italy strongly reaffirms its firm commitment to combating a phenomenon of extreme gravity such as online sexual abuse and exploitation of children. Following the invitation by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, to reach an agreement at second reading on the so-called interim Regulation, Italy intends to respond in a constructive, pragmatic and cooperative spirit. // Therefore, in order to ensure the necessary continuity of enforcement action and in response to the call by the President of the European Parliament, Italy expresses its vote in favour of the adoption of a regulatory framework replicating the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, for a duration that would hopefully allow for the adoption and entry into force of a permanent regime.
> However, while making this opening, Italy considers it essential to recall the serious concerns and reservations already expressed in the national statement attached to the minutes of the Coreper meeting of 28 January 2026. These reservations concern specific and crucial substantive aspects, which require in-depth reflection in the further work on the long-term CSAM Regulation:
> • Scanning powers entrusted to private entities: Italy reiterates its strong opposition to the adoption of a regulatory framework that would, in practice, authorise service providers — private entities, largely non-European — to carry out mass scanning and detection activities;
> • Proportionality criteria: in order to prevent detection activities by service providers from resulting in generalised monitoring, such activities should be subject to strict proportionality. Moreover, in order to safeguard the delicate balance between the legitimate needs of law enforcement authorities and respect for fundamental rights, such activities should be limited exclusively to known CSAM material;
> • Judicial and institutional oversight: Italy reiterates the need to provide adequate institutional safeguards and effective control mechanisms over detection activities by independent third parties (judicial or administrative authorities). Such safeguards are essential to protect users’ rights;
> • End-to-end encryption: Italy remains convinced of the imperative need to explicitly exclude from the scope of the future Regulation, as well as from all detection activities, content protected by end-to-end encryption, in order to safeguard cybersecurity and the confidentiality of communications.
> Finally, Italy reiterates that the temporary replication of the interim regime must be regarded as an exceptional measure. The present favourable vote does not prejudge Italy’s position on the above- mentioned issues in the negotiations on the long-term regime, which will continue to be guided by the need to ensure full respect for fundamental rights and the protection of personal data.
We agree with the reservations and constraints noted by Italy. Mentioning that it is inconstitutional, by the way, would have been a good thing.
Edit: but how is it possible that Italy was the only one to state these requirements? One single Country in the whole of the eu?!
All EU members have now voted affimative according to the EU document: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11513-2026-...
The farce corner: as I looked into data to get a better idea of the events, the keyword 'metsola' brought one result:
> # Euronews: Newsletter (2026-01-14) : Metsola predicts Iranian regime collapse; US to host Danish, Greenlandic officials
For convenience, the
## Statement by Italy
> Italy strongly reaffirms its firm commitment to combating a phenomenon of extreme gravity such as online sexual abuse and exploitation of children. Following the invitation by the President of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, to reach an agreement at second reading on the so-called interim Regulation, Italy intends to respond in a constructive, pragmatic and cooperative spirit. // Therefore, in order to ensure the necessary continuity of enforcement action and in response to the call by the President of the European Parliament, Italy expresses its vote in favour of the adoption of a regulatory framework replicating the provisions of Regulation (EU) 2021/1232, for a duration that would hopefully allow for the adoption and entry into force of a permanent regime.
> However, while making this opening, Italy considers it essential to recall the serious concerns and reservations already expressed in the national statement attached to the minutes of the Coreper meeting of 28 January 2026. These reservations concern specific and crucial substantive aspects, which require in-depth reflection in the further work on the long-term CSAM Regulation:
> • Scanning powers entrusted to private entities: Italy reiterates its strong opposition to the adoption of a regulatory framework that would, in practice, authorise service providers — private entities, largely non-European — to carry out mass scanning and detection activities;
> • Proportionality criteria: in order to prevent detection activities by service providers from resulting in generalised monitoring, such activities should be subject to strict proportionality. Moreover, in order to safeguard the delicate balance between the legitimate needs of law enforcement authorities and respect for fundamental rights, such activities should be limited exclusively to known CSAM material;
> • Judicial and institutional oversight: Italy reiterates the need to provide adequate institutional safeguards and effective control mechanisms over detection activities by independent third parties (judicial or administrative authorities). Such safeguards are essential to protect users’ rights;
> • End-to-end encryption: Italy remains convinced of the imperative need to explicitly exclude from the scope of the future Regulation, as well as from all detection activities, content protected by end-to-end encryption, in order to safeguard cybersecurity and the confidentiality of communications.
> Finally, Italy reiterates that the temporary replication of the interim regime must be regarded as an exceptional measure. The present favourable vote does not prejudge Italy’s position on the above- mentioned issues in the negotiations on the long-term regime, which will continue to be guided by the need to ensure full respect for fundamental rights and the protection of personal data.
We agree with the reservations and constraints noted by Italy. Mentioning that it is inconstitutional, by the way, would have been a good thing.
Edit: but how is it possible that Italy was the only one to state these requirements? One single Country in the whole of the eu?!